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Dear  distinguished  colleagues,  delegates,  ladies  and 
gentlemen,
It is with much pleasure and optimism that I address you this 
morning, on the occasion of the 3rd International Conference 
on Humanities, Economics and Geography, as well as the 3rd 
ICRIET and ICHBES conferences, 2014.
These conferences have converged to become a melting pot in 
respect of the vast range of disciplines embraced, as well as its 
accommodation of various backgrounds – in relation to 
academic and scientific research.  
Such a forum for the exchange and discussion of scientific and 
research perspectives, as well as the element incorporating its 
multi  disciplinary  approach,  have  become  vital  in  efforts 
aimed at addressing recent global  issues – and in particular, 
the very crucial  issue of economic recovery from the recent 
global financial crisis.
It is from this perspective that I focus my speech on one very 
pivotal  contributory  factor  and  component  of  the  recent 
financial crisis – namely, the central role played and assumed 
by auditors of financial entities.
Auditors  have  assumed an  increasingly fundamental  role  in 
matters relating to global and national recovery – not only in 
view  of  their  position  within  business  and  financial 
corporations, but also in the light of the role played by audits 
in capital markets.
Marianne  Ojo   is  with  the  Faculty  of  Commerce  and  Administration, 
School  of Economic  and Decision Sciences,  North-West  University,  South 
Africa (e-mail:   marianneojo@hotmail.com).
Audits serve as vital signaling mechanisms to capital markets 
and investors alike.
It  is as a result of such significance that primarily,  auditors' 
activities  and  roles,  have  to  be  effectively safeguarded  and 
monitored.  The  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  was  enacted  partly  in 
response to the vital recognition of auditors' significance to the 
corporate industry and financial markets.
However, as is the case with previous legislation which have 
been introduced in the wake of previous and current financial 
crises,  as  well  as  various  hypotheses,  namely  the  Efficient 
Markets  Hypothesis  and  the  Efficient  Capital  Markets 
Hypothesis,  such  legislation  and  hypotheses  have  failed  to 
address and account for regulatory gaps that have culminated 
and contributed to recent financial and economic crises.
The  extent  and degree  to  which non audit  services  and  the 
mandatory rotation of audit firms impact audit independence, 
has  continued  to  provide  the  forum  and  impetus  for 
controverisal  debates.  Indeed,  several  empirical  studies have 
revealed  that  the  provision  of  non  audit  services  or  the 
mandatory  rotation  of  audit  firms,  may  not  severely  or 
significantly impact audit independence to the same degree or 
with the level of significance as was initially perceived.
For these reasons, there has been an increasingly lax attitude in 
respect  of these two factors,  namely non audit  services  and 
mandatory  rotation  –  and  particularly  with  respect  to  the 
mandatory rotation of audit firms.
Whilst a period of 5-7 years had previously been promulgated 
and recommended in respect of the mandatory rotation of audit 
firms, a more relaxed approach is evidenced by a recent Draft 
Law which is to be enacted across Europe and which proposes 
that  public  interest  entities  (namely  banks,  insurance 
companies  and  listed  firms),  should  rotate  their  audit  firms 
every 14 years – with the possibility of extension to 25 years 
where certain safeguards are in place.
Conversely, a more stringent approach - when compared with 
mandatory  audit  rotation  (but  laxer  in  comparison  to 
previously  existing  measures  such  as  traditional  audit 
techniques) is evidenced by section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act and the APB's Revised Ethical Standard 5. However, the 
effectiveness of the legislative provisions governing these laws 
and standards have been questioned – not only because of lee-
ways and gaps which have been exposed with such laws, but 
also questions and controversial debates which have arisen in 
relation to whether conflicts of interests actually arise from the 
provision of certain non audit services.
A very important aspect of safeguards to audit independence, 
however,  is  the issue  relating to  audit  market  concentration 
and  the  regulation  of  the  international  audit  market.  The 
consequences of the restriction of mid-tier audit firms in their 
performance of certain functions (which may be governed by 
contractual  clauses  that  delegate  such  functions  to  Big 
Four   audit   firms),   is   frequently  overlooked.  The 
encouragement of a „Too-Big-To-Fail“ attitude among the Big 
Four audit firms, not  only  has  repercussions  in  terms  of 
moral   hazard,   but   also  under-estimates  the  roles   and 
capacities which could be incorporated by mid-tier audit firms 
in mitigating occurrences which are attributed to insufficient 
safeguards  and  the  resulting  compromise  of  the  auditor's 
independence.
It is still possible to provide a combination of non audit and 
audit services in a manner whereby safeguards – namely those 
relating  to  segregation  of  duties  play  a  formidable  and 
effective role.  This  could be effectively achieved  through a 
collaboration between mid tier and Big Four audit firms. Now 
that there are  just four major audit firms and there is an ever 
growing need for the involvement of more capable audit firms 
in facilitating collaborations whereby segregation of duties are 
enhanced  and  conflicts  of  interests  reduced,  mid  tier  audit 
firms should be encouraged to fill  in gaps that the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, APB Ethical Standards and other legislation have 
attempted to address.
Furthermore, even though measures aimed at enhancing audit 
independence and objectivity are crucial  to safeguarding the 
auditor's  independence,  integrity  also  remains  a  vital  factor 
and reason why certain gaps in the literature relating to audit 
independence could never be fully accounted for. 
Distinguished  delegates,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  it  is  on  this 
note that I conclude my address for this morning. I wish you 
all  a  very productive  –  as  well  as  memorable  and  pleasant 
week in Abu Dhabi.
Thank you.
Abstract - Whilst the benefits and potentials of the dual roles  
assumed by external auditors are emphasized, as well as the  
need to ensure that safeguards operating to guard against a  
compromise of objectivity and independence are in place, this  
paper also highlights the fact that even though such dual roles  
are  appropriate  in  certain  cases  –  as  illustrated  by  
justifications for limitations imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley  
Act and other relevant and applicable legislation –  instances  
also persist where section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley, with regard 
to internal audit outsourcing, may have been over-reactionary 
and  may  continue  to  hinder  both  companies  and  their  
auditors.
Key Words:  independence, objectivity,  Sarbanes Oxley Act,  
FSMA section 166, non-audit services
I. INTRODUCTION
This  paper  considers  the  dual  roles  of  external  auditors:  whether 
acting in the dual capacity of external auditor and internal auditor 
(with respect to internal and external audits), does significantly or not 
significantly,  affect  the  objectivity  and  independence  attributes 
required in exercising their functions.
It is also important to highlight that a consideration of the dual roles 
of the external auditor and internal auditor will  involve examining 
whether  it  is  appropriate  for  the  external  auditor  to  incorporate 
internal audit  responsibilities in certain circumstances (as provided 
for  by  ISA 610,  Using  the  Work  of  Internal  Auditors,  as  well  as 
provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act which imposes limitations on 
external auditors' abilities to perform in a dual capacity - particularly 
with respect to internal audit outsourcing services). It will consider 
the impact of the performance in such a dual capacity on the ability 
of the external and internal  audit  work to  be carried out  with the 
required attributes of objectivity and independence. The structure of 
this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  literature  review  section 
recalls the concepts of integrity, independence and objectivity and is 
aimed  at  highlighting  their  significance  as  ethical  values  and 
attributes  in  the  exercise  of  audit  and  accounting  functions.  The 
section following a view of the methodology then illustrates how the 
focus within accounting and audit roles have changed over the years, 
as well as highlights why there is need for a return to, and focus on 
traditional  auditing techniques.   Certain  duties and responsibilities 
which  the  auditor  is  capable  of  undertaking  and  is  permitted  to 
undertake  by  law,  as  well  as  prohibited  activities  under  various 
legislation will be considered under this section. A consideration of 
the dual role of the external auditor as a skilled person, as well as 
safeguards  which  are  in  place  to  ensure  that  a  compromise  of 
independence and objectivity, whilst performing delegated functions, 
does  not  occur,  will  then  be  undertaken  –  before  a  conclusion  is 
derived. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Non Audit Services and Audit Independence
The  APB  (Auditing  Practices  Board)  Ethical  Standards  11 and  5 
(Revised), particularly, are concerned with the integrity, objectivity 
and independence of auditors. Paragraphs 10 and 13  of the APB's 
Ethical  Standard  1  (Revised)  respectively  distinguishes  between 
objectivity and independence. In particular, paragraph 13 states that: 
"Independence is  freedom from situations  and  relationships  which 
make it probable that a reasonable and informed third party would 
conclude  that  objectivity either  is  impaired  or  could  be  impaired. 
Independence  is  related  to  and  underpins  objectivity.  However, 
whereas objectivity is a personal behavioral characteristic concerning 
the auditor’s state of mind, independence relates to the circumstances 
surrounding the audit, including the financial, employment, business 
and personal relationships between the auditor and the audited entity 
and its connected parties."
Other  definitions  of  independence  have  been  provided  as  follows 
(Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt; 2001):2 - "the conditional probability 
of reporting a discovered breach" by DeAngelo; the ability to resist 
client pressure (Knapp): a function of character - with characteristics 
of integrity and trustworthiness being essential (Magill and Previts); 
and an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias - 
1 See Auditing Practices Board, Ethical Standards 1(Revised) 
2 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, 2001 at page 19
this definition being provided by the AICPA White Paper definition 
(AICPA,  1997)  which  defines  independence  as  an  absence  of 
interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias.
The  Institute  of  Internal  Auditors  (IIA)'s  published  framework  of 
independence lists  seven  threats  to  audit  independence (which are 
similar to those threats faced by external auditors) and these threats 
include:3 self-review  threat;  social  pressures;  economic  interests 
;personal relationships; familiarity threat; cultural, racial and gender 
biases;  cognitive  biases.  The  Auditing  Practices  Board's  Ethical 
Standard  5  (paragraph  25)  also  identifies  the  following  principal 
types of threats to the auditor’s objectivity and independence:4
• self-interest threat 
• self-review threat 
• management threat
• advocacy threat
• familiarity (or trust) threat
• intimidation threat
The focus on ownership rules of audit firms, derives not only from 
consequences  emanating  for   audit  market  concentration,  but  also 
from  the  impact  generated  on  auditor  independence.  Employee 
ownership,  as  well  as “the resulting profit  sharing amongst  senior 
auditors” serves as good signaling mechanism of the quality of audit 
services to the market.5 The importance of retaining audit quality is 
also a concern in the bid to provide greater access, expansion and 
entry to the audit market. Would the admission of more players from 
the mid-tier audit firms into the audit market generate more positive 
impacts and consequences for audit independence? It is certainly the 
case  that  increased  audit  concentration  within  the  audit  market 
certainly has consequences for audit independence since there is less 
choice and competition between the firms in the market, as well as 
devastating consequences, in respect of systemic risk, if the demise of 
another Big Four audit firm, should occur.
Joint audits, that is, mid-tier firms carrying out joint audits with Big 
Four firms, as a means of increasing their presence at international 
level,  is  considered “the priority step in tackling the concentration 
issue”.6 Whether such audits can also facilitate greater levels of audit 
independence also constitutes an interesting matter.
III. METHODOLOGY 
Focus  will  be  placed  on  the  perspective  of  the  external  auditor 
performing internal  audit  functions  -  although the paper  will  also 
consider to an extent, internal audit concepts, and the internal audit 
function. 
Changing  Roles  of  Internal  and  External  Auditors  and  Post 
Enron  Consequences:  Why  A   Return  to  More  Traditional 
Auditing Techniques is Required
As well as evidence which suggests that the internal auditor's role has 
changed in recent years to one of a consultant nature, in contrast to 
3
3
 J Stewart and N Subramaniam,  January 2010 at page 7
4See paragraph 25 https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/APB/ES-5-(Revised)-Non-audit-services-provided-to-
audi.aspx
5See European Commission,  “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their 
Consequences For Audit Market Concentration” at page 88
6 European Commission, Study on the effects of the implementation of the 
"acquis" on statutory audits  of annual and consolidated accounts  including 
the consequences on the audit market (2011) at page 6 of 9
that of a policing role,7 evidence has also been provided to support 
the fact that the external auditor's role changed during the nineties 
from  that  synonymous  to  a  watch  dog  to  a  less  vigilant  and 
scrutinizing  role  (Cunningham;  2006).8 Such  evidence  which 
include: 
- Firstly, the widening scope of audit firm services beyond the audit 
function -  which has resulted in  relationships which have affected 
audit  firms'  independence,9 secondly,  increase  in  accounting 
irregularities  during  the  1990s  which  have  arisen  in  the  form of 
widespread  premature  revenue  recognition  and  other  forms  of 
creative  accounting,  and  thirdly,  evidence  of  auditor  ability  to 
influence audit quality and liability risk.10
Traditional  auditing  techniques  focus  on  internal  controls  and 
demonstrate the auditor's thorough reputation as compared to the lax 
and complacent  attitude which has  been evidenced  through recent 
increases in creative accounting practices and the widespread use of 
off balance sheet instruments as illustrated in the case of Enron. For 
this reason, a return to and focus on traditional auditing techniques, 
as well as auditing techniques which focus on internal controls is a 
much needed move - whilst also supporting audits which also take 
into consideration, strategic and operational controls. Such a stance 
would be greatly facilitated in cases where an external auditor is able 
to undertake certain permitted internal audit responsibilities.
A return  to  traditional  auditing  techniques  is  also  advocated  for, 
since,  as  will  be  illustrated  in  the  following  section,  it  has  been 
argued that many Post Enron reforms,  notably the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act,  do not  go far  enough in  their  efforts  to  address  the  issue of 
independence – primarily through the prohibition of particular non 
audit services.
Limitations  On  the  Use  of  Internal  Audit  Work  and  the 
Assumption of Internal Audit Roles - As Performed By External 
Auditors
In order to prevent or avoid situations where over reliance on internal 
audit  work could  result  in  a  compromise  of  the  external  auditor's 
objectivity,  certain  safeguards  serve  to  assist  in  "clarifying  the 
circumstances where the work of the internal audit function cannot be 
used and therefore is prohibited." Such instances, as provided for by 
the ISA 610 (Revised), paragraphs 14] are as follows:11
− Where  the  function’s  organizational  status  and  relevant 
policies  and  procedures  do  not  adequately  support  the 
objectivity of internal auditors;
− Where the function lacks sufficient competence; or 
− Where the function does not apply a systematic and 
disciplined approach, including quality control.
According to Paragraph 9 of the  INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
ON  AUDITING  610  (REVISED),12 the  external  auditor's  sole 
responsibility for the audit opinion expressed, is not reduced by the 
7
7
 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, at page 13
8
8
 See L Cunningham, (2006) at page 23. Also see M Ojo, General Literature 
on the Audit Expectations Gap, Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol. VIII,  
Nos. 1 & 2, January-December 2007 
9 see L Cunningham, page 24
10
1
 see L Cunningham, pages 24 and 25
11 See  [ISA  610  (Revised),  paragraph  14]  and  IFAC,  "Basis  for 
Conclusions, Prepared by the Staff of the IAASB" ISA 610 (Revised), Using 
the Work of Internal Auditors, and ISA 315 (Revised)
12 USING THE WORK OF INTERNAL AUDITORS 
external auditor’s use of the work of the internal audit function on the 
engagement. 
Paragraph  24  also  expressly states  that  the  following  information 
should be included in the audit documentation - where the external 
auditor incorporates the work of the internal audit function:
− Evaluation of whether the function’s organizational status 
and relevant policies and procedures adequately support the 
objectivity of the internal auditors; the level of competence 
of  the  function;  and  whether  the  function  applies  a 
systematic  and  disciplined  approach,  including  quality 
control.
− The nature and extent of the work used and the basis for 
that decision; and ;
− The audit procedures performed by the external auditor to 
evaluate the adequacy of the work used.
Outsourcing and Co Sourcing of Internal Audit Services 
As highlighted in the previous sections, there are certain duties and 
responsibilities which the external auditor is capable of undertaking 
and permitted to undertake by law. Under the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
the prohibition of the external auditor's capacity to perform dual roles 
in respect of performing certain non -audit  services which include 
internal audit outsourcing services, is highlighted.
Section  201  of  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002  lists  certain 
prohibited services which do not lie within the scope of practice of 
external  auditors  of  U.S  public  companies.  These  prohibited 
services13 are based on three primary criteria, namely: i) An auditor 
cannot  function  in  the  role  of  management;  ii)  An auditor  cannot 
audit his or her work; and iii) An auditor cannot serve in an external 
advocacy  role  for  the  client.  Internal  audit  outsourcing  services 
constitute one of the services listed as prohibited and even though the 
provision of such services by external auditors to their clients is no 
longer permissible, it is reported by Ernst and Young (2006)14 that 
public accounting and specialist firms provide these services to non-
audit clients. 
Section  201  of  Sarbanes-Oxley,  with  regard  to  internal  audit 
outsourcing,  may have been over-reactionary and may continue to 
hinder  both  companies  and  their  auditors.  Furthermore,  various 
shortcomings of the Sarbanes Oxley Act have been identified which 
include:15 The inability of the Sarbanes Oxley Act to address the issue 
of  independence  of  mind  through  a  focus  on  actual  conflicts  of 
interests  faced by auditors;  ii)  the  fact  that  the  Act  still  permitted 
audit  firms  to  undertake  tax  consultancy  work  –  even  though  it 
prohibited  the  same  firms  from  carrying  out  some  non-audit 
services  ;iii)  that  although  the  Act  required  rotation  of  the  audit 
partner, it did not require rotation of the audit firm; and iv) the failure 
(Effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 
December 15, 2013).
13
1
 Prohibited services include: 
- Book keeping or other services related to the accounting records or 
financial statements of the client whose statements are being audited;
- Financial reporting systems design and implementation;
- Internal audit outsourcing services.
14 See J Stewart and N Subramaniam, January 2010 at page 17 and Ernst 
&Young, Trends in Australian and New Zealand Internal Auditing, Third  
Annual Benchmarking Survey 2006, Ernst & Young, Australia.
15See European Commission, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their 
Consequences  For  Audit  Market  Concentration”  at  page  52;  Moore  et  al 
(2006) page 14 cited
of the Act to address the “very common occurrence” of individual 
auditors moving from their firms to their clients.
In jurisdictions with developed audit markets, such as the UK and the 
U.S,  the  issue  of  “client  switching”  and  the  incidence  whereby 
mandatory audit rotation is not undertaken by certain audit firms is of 
particular concern. Furthermore, even though the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
is  U.S  Law,  its  impact  on  global  audit  practices  is  evident.  Two 
reasons which are attributed to this include:16
− Firstly, the fact that many multinational companies have a 
US listing and are therefore directly affected by the Act;
− Secondly, regulators, auditors and companies in many other 
jurisdictions  have  adopted  similar  rules  to  the  Sarbanes 
Oxley Act – for example, Ethical Standards 5 (as discussed 
under  section  A),  of  the  UK  FRC's  Auditing  Practices 
Board which prohibits audit firms from undertaking certain 
types  of  non-audit  work  for  companies  they  audit,  and 
requires certain safeguards to be in place to isolate audit 
from non-audit work. 
Is  section  201  of  Sarbanes-Oxley,  with  regard  to  internal  audit 
outsourcing  over-reactionary?  Could  it  continue  to  hinder  both 
companies  and  their  auditors?  The  following  sections  relating  to 
knowledge spill-over gains, cost management and financial reporting 
quality  further  illustrate  why section  201  may not  fully  serve  its 
purpose.
Knowledge Spillover Gains:  Knowledge spillover  is the  result  of 
accounting firms benefiting from the relationship between the audit 
and non-audit services offered to their clients.  In the case of internal 
audit  outsourcing,  the  efficiency  of  financial  audits  is  bolstered 
because the auditor is able to benefit from knowledge gained during 
the performance of internal audit functions.  The auditor is able to 
gain a better understanding of the client’s internal controls because 
the  auditor  has  had  close  experience  with  the  internal  control 
environment as part of the client’s internal audit function.  
Cost Management: Audit firms are not the only party to monetarily 
benefit  from  the  outsourcing  of  internal  audit.   Companies  that 
outsource  their  internal  audit  function  may  reap  potential  cost 
benefits as well.  In the article “Internal Audit Outsourcing” Aldhizer 
and Cashell (2003) explain: “For companies, outsourcing the internal 
audit  function  offers  potential  cost  benefits.   Internal  audit 
outsourcing may reduce  overlapping  positions  and  audit  effort  by 
creating  more  flexibility  in  increasing  and  decreasing  workloads. 
Additionally, outsourcing allows a company to replace "fixed" cost 
employees with "variable" fees for services.  Finally, a wide range of 
expertise is available from large firms that would be too expensive 
for a company to maintain internally.” 
Accounting Risk Management and Financial Reporting Quality: 
An  investigation  by  Prawitt  et.,  al.  (2011)  found  evidence  that 
suggested  that  high  quality  internal  audit  functions  (regardless  of 
outsourcing) are associated with lower accounting risk.  Furthermore, 
Prawitt  et.  Al.  (2003)  found  that  companies  that  outsourced  their 
internal audit function to their external auditor prior to the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley  had  lower  accounting  risk  than  companies  that 
outsourced their internal audit function to another third-party service 
provider and companies that maintained their own in-house internal 
audit function.
16See European Commission, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their 
Consequences For Audit Market Concentration” at page 5
Based  on  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
restatements  and  non-audit  fees  paid  by  a  client  to  its  external 
auditor, it was found that companies that were not required to restate 
their financial statements paid more in internal audit outsourcing fees 
to their external auditors than companies that did,  in fact,  have to 
record  material  restatements  (Prawitt  et  Al.  2003).  This  evidence 
suggests  a  negatively  correlating  relationship  between  the 
outsourcing of internal audit functions and the occurrence of material 
financial restatements.
Arguments have also been put forward to bolster the stance that "an 
outsourced  provider  may  be  more  independent  than  an  in-house 
internal audit function since it is difficult for an employee to be truly 
independent of management, and that on the other hand, there also 
factors which could affect the objectivity of outsourced providers in 
the  same  manner  that  external  auditor  independence  can  be 
compromised."17 It is also argued that "regardless of whether external 
assurance  is  obtained  for  sustainability  reports  (which  contain  a 
combination of quantitative18 and qualitative data), that internal audit 
can play a role in verifying this data for management purposes."
The Institute  of  Internal  Auditors  (IIA) also recommends a  list  of 
factors  to  be  considered  when  assessing  potential  outsourcing 
engagements:19 available resources, size of the organization, types of 
outsourcing  alternatives,  Law,  Statute,  or  regulation  (since  some 
companies  may  be  prohibited  by  statute  or  regulation  from 
outsourcing internal audit services to their external auditors),  taking 
into consideration an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
outsourcing, as well as the following:20 Independence of the external 
service  providers;  allegiance  of  in-house  resources  versus  that  of 
external  service  provider;  professional  standards  followed  by  the 
external  service  provider;  qualifications  of  the  service  provider; 
staffing – training, turnover, rotation of staff, management; flexibility 
in staffing resources to meet engagement needs or special requests; 
availability of resources.
There have been further evidence and arguments aimed at bolstering 
the view that conflicts of interests do not necessarily result from the 
proportion of non-audit services (NAS) fees compared to the audit 
fees, but from the fact that by performing two kinds of services, the 
audit is serving two kinds of clients.21  Even though such arguments 
have  their  merits,  the  fact  that  an  audit  firm  which  derives  a 
significant percentage of its income and means of sustenance from a 
particular NAS or client, is likely to be influenced and dominated by 
such dependence, cannot be denied.  It is certainly true that an audit 
firm may be compelled to “rename” a NAS in order to avoid being 
caught or “captured” by the prohibited list of NAS (as is mandated by 
section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act). Hence it could be effectively 
argued that despite the list of prohibited services, section 201 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act may not fully achieve its aims.
External Auditors Also Undertaking the Role of Skilled Persons
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 
deals with the powers of the UK's financial  services regulator,  the 
17 For instance, where the audit firm is dependent on a client for a major 
source of income and would not wish to lose such a client, self-review threats 
etc; see ibid at pages 17 and 18
18
1
 Furthermore, "where information being verified is not quantifiable, internal 
auditors could face objectivity threats arising from social pressure and 
familiarity." see ibid at page 21
19Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), "The Role of Internal Auditing in 
Resourcing the Internal Audit Activity" IIA Position Paper January 2009 
pages 4 and 5 https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Public
%20Documents/IPPF_PP_Role_of_IA_in_Resourcing_the_IAA_01-09.pdf
Financial Services Authority (FSA), to obtain a report by a skilled 
person (also referred to as a reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in 
performing its functions under the FSMA 2000.  In  addition to  its 
powers to appoint skilled persons to carry out certain functions under 
section 166, sections 167 and 168 of the Act also empower the FSA 
to appoint competent persons to carry out investigative tasks.
The differences between the roles of skilled persons (also known as 
reporting accountants) and competent persons, are demonstrated by 
the bearer of the costs for work carried out by these persons.  For 
work undertaken by skilled persons, the regulated firm (who employs 
them)  bears  the  cost  directly  whilst  for  work  undertaken  by 
competent  persons,  the  FSA bears  the  cost.22  According to  Singh 
(2003),  even  though  skilled  persons  are  usually  approved  by  the 
FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of the regulated firm.23 
The  use  of  skilled  persons'  reports  has  been  controversial  and 
concerns have been expressed in relation to the FSA using a skilled 
person's report instead of devoting its own resources to investigating 
a matter.”24 Certain measures have been adopted to safeguard against 
possibilities of a conflict of interest arising between the auditors of 
the  regulated  firm who  are  commissioned  by the  FSA as  skilled 
persons  but  paid  by the  regulated  firm.  Chapter  Five  of  the  FSA 
Supervision Manual provides examples of circumstances where the 
FSA may use skilled persons. 
IV. CONCLUSION
It  has been demonstrated that certain capacities exist  in which the 
dual role of the external auditor (in undertaking internal audit roles as 
well  as skilled persons roles) could be immensely beneficial  to an 
entity or organization. This arises as a result of the invaluable skills 
and expertise which such a role provides and incorporates into the 
audit  process.  Even  where  such  an  exercise  of  a  dual  role  is 
prohibited  by  law  or  as  a  result  of  organizational  policies, 
opportunities exist whereby close cooperation between external and 
internal auditors could provide for increased scope in implementing 
and benefiting from each other's work. The opportunities and benefits 
of drawing on the skills and expertise gained by an external auditor 
who has acquired so much knowledge by virtue of the exercise of 
both roles and the experience acquired from having exercised such 
roles, should not be under estimated.
As recommended in chapter five of the Supervision Manual of the 
FSA, there are certain situations whereby such a dual role may not be 
warranted, where such dual roles should not be exercised routinely, 
where  such  dual  role  should  only  be  implemented  after  having 
considered other alternatives, and more importantly, why such dual 
role  could  contribute  and  generate  added  value  by  virtue  of  the 
increased  expertise  or  knowledge  which  such  a  dual  role  brings. 
Where  concerns  relating  to  a  compromise  of  independence  and 
objectivity  arise,  then  prohibitions  and  restrictions  imposed  by 
section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act are, to a great extent, justified.
As is particularly the case with external auditors, the reliability of 
internal  controls  also  plays  a  huge  and  crucial  role  in  the  audit 
process - as well as those in charge of those internal controls. Where 
safeguards such as the segregation of duties and other measures are 
incorporated  into  the  process  to  reduce  instances  or  situations 
20 see ibid
21See European Commision,  “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their 
Consequences For Audit Market Concentration” at page 166
22See J Hitchins, M Hogg and D Mallet (2001) at page 295
23
2
 See  D Singh, The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and 
Supervision (2003) at page 9
24
2
 See ibid at page 135
whereby such controls could be manipulated, then benefits of having 
an external  auditor  serve in  a dual  role  capacity may well  extend 
beyond its stated disadvantages. 
Benefits  accruing  from  having  a  dual  role  include  namely  the 
acquisition of knowledge and expertise gained during the latter stages 
of  the  process  -  which  could  assist  in  providing  more  accurate 
judgments during latter stages of the process. This is also similar to 
the  position  which  exists  with  external  auditors:  whereby  the 
mandatory  rotation  of  audit  firms,  whilst  serving  to  ensure  that 
independence  and  objectivity  is  not  compromised,  could  also  be 
detrimental  where  the  external  auditor  leaves  the  firm 
shortly/prematurely after having been employed by the firm.  In the 
case of internal audit outsourcing, the efficiency of financial audits is 
bolstered  because  the  auditor  is  able  to  benefit  from  knowledge 
gained  during  the  performance  of  internal  audit  functions.   The 
auditor is able to gain a better understanding of the client’s internal 
controls  because  the  auditor  has  had  close  experience  with  the 
internal  control  environment  as  part  of  the  client’s  internal  audit 
function.
The  firm  incurs  greater  costs  in  employing  a  new auditor  in  re 
acquiring the knowledge which the previous auditor had acquired - 
having left the firm prematurely. Further, the knowledge which could 
have been employed by the leaving auditor is not fully maximized in 
the process.
Up till 2013, there had been no requirement at European level for the 
mandatory rotation of audit firms – even though some member states 
had gone further than Article 42 of Directive 2006/43/EC in requiring 
mandatory  audit  firm  rotation.  This  however,  has  changed  with 
mandatory requirement – pursuant to a draft law that would “require 
public-interest  entities  such  as  banks,  insurance  firms,  and  listed 
companies  to  rotate  audit  firms  every 14  years”(and  such period 
could be extended to 25 years when certain safeguards are put into 
place).25 Other notable features of the Draft Law also include:26
- Prohibition of “Big Four-only” contractual clauses that 
require a company’s audit to be done by one of the Big 
Four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PwC). 
− Requirement that auditors of public-interest entities (PIEs) 
publish audit reports according to international standards 
and provide shareholders and investors with a detailed 
understanding of what the auditor did and an overall 
assurance of the accuracy of the company’s accounts. 
− Prohibition of audit firms from providing non-audit 
services that could jeopardize independence.
Whether the distinction between those non audit services which are 
not  considered  to  impair  independence  is  effective,  logical  and 
justified, constitutes the basis for arguments which counter the basis 
for prohibition of certain non-audit services – pursuant to legislation 
such as section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and Ethical Standard 5 
25 “The  idea  of  mandatory  audit  firm  rotation  also  is  being  explored 
elsewhere.  The UK Competition  Commission is considering imposing term 
limits for large listed companies and will come to a final decision by Oct. 20. 
In the United States, the PCAOB has been studying the issue of mandatory 
audit firm rotation for public companies since issuing a concept release that 
included  the  topic  in  August  2011.  However,  a  PCAOB member has  also 
highlighted   that  many  obstacles  make  adoption  of  mandatory  audit  firm 
rotation unlikely.”  K Tysiac, „Europe Takes Step Toward Mandatory Audit 
Firm  Rotation“,  Journal  of  Accountancy   April  2013 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/20137862.htm
26See ibid
(Revised) of the APB. Partnership engagements between one audit 
firm providing audit services solely and exclusively, and another firm 
offering non audit services, provided ethical standards on objectivity, 
independence and integrity are  complied  with,  may achieve better 
results  –  provided  other  safeguards  are  well  in  place.  Proposals, 
legislation and efforts aimed at encouraging partnerships between Big 
Four audit  firms and mid-tier firms are also welcomed, as well  as 
external investments in mid-tier audit firms are welcomed – provided 
that audit quality is retained.
Even though concerns persist that there would be a constraint in the 
global growth of EU audit firms (owned by external investors) who 
collaborate  in  a  “network  structure”  with  U.S  auditors  –  such 
constraint  being  attributed  to  application  of  U.S  rules,  as  already 
highlighted  in  this  paper,  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  has  already 
influenced  many  countries  –  by  virtue  of  U.S  listing  rules' 
applicability  in  these  jurisdictions.  Hence  such  collaboration  as 
embodied  by  such  network  structure  should  not  be  considered  a 
threat to the world-wide growth of such firms. Furthermore, rules or 
covenants  could  be  agreed  upon  by  such  firms  –  where  undue 
restrictions are likely to be foreseen.
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